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DISENFRANCHISEMENT AS PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON
THE RACIAL USES OF INFAMIA
George P. Fletcher
The practice of disenfranchising felons, though decreasing, is still widespread.
In this Article, Professor George Fletcher reflects on the use of disenfranchise-
ment as punishment, the lack of a convincing theoretical justification for it, and
its disproportionate impact on the African.American community. Fletcher pres-
ents a number of powerful arguments against the constitutionality of the
practice, but he emphasizes that there is a deeper problem with disenfranchise-
ment as punishment: It reinforces the branding of felons as an "untouchable"
class and thus helps to prevent their effective reintegration into our society.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the conceits of the American literature on criminal justice is
that we honestly articulate the purposes of punishment. We are all familiar
with the litany about retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and confine-
ment as goals of sentencing. The grand debate among the philosophers is
whether retribution or social protection should be the defining value of the
system. The Kantians are committed to doing justice by visiting upon each
criminal act a punishment that represents the offender's just desserts; the
utilitarians are dedicated to the use of coercive force only so far as the
benefits to society outweigh costs suffered by the offender. Avoiding this
conflict in principle, legislators are generally content to list all the possible
purposes of punishment and retire from the debate with the hope that in
practice the proper mix of purposes will come about.
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
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The actual practice of the criminal law, however, suggests that in fact
the system often pursues goals other than the ones conventionally articu-
lated. The vindication of the victims' interests might fit into the framework
of just punishment. Yet some leading retributivists focus exclusively on the
vindication of the violated norm or expressing the outrage of the commu-
nity, without focusing specifically on the need of the victim to see justice
done. More serious departures from both retributive and deterrent approaches
to punishment result from schemes of permanent warehousing and supervi-
sion of offenders. Here, one need only mention life imprisonment for third-
time offenders (three strikes and you're out)' and the growing popularity
of compulsory registration and public notification of resident sex offenders
(Megan's law).'
These fashionable measures of repression hardly make sense under any
standard rationale for punishment. For several reasons they fail to meet the
accepted criteria of retributive punishment. They are lifelong sanctions,
often for minor offenses, and therefore flout the retributive principle that
the offender should be required (and permitted) to pay his debt in full
to society. These measures could hardly be retributive, for they stand in
clear disproportion to the gravity of the offenses that trigger their applica-
tion: They are in response rather to the perceived dangerousness of the
offender. The standard retributive maxim, "Let the punishment fit the crime,"
is ignored. Preferred is the surrogate slogan: "Let the punishment fit the
criminal." Further, these sanctions can hardly be justified by utilitarian
considerations. Of course, they achieve some measure of social protection,
but at what cost? Confining a habitual embezzler for life would have to
prevent a great deal of embezzlement in order to justify the annual $40,000
cost typically estimated for confining a felon. Given the fact that people
can protect themselves against embezzlement by far less costly means, a
cost/benefit calculus hardly justifies the application of "three strikes" laws to
nonviolent offenders. And a simple utilitarian calculus of immediate costs
and benefits ignores the side-effects of having a confinement rate that is
among the highest in the world, side-effects that include harm caused
within the prison population, the loss of productive services to society,
damage to stigmatized and abandoned family members, and, as we shall see,
the implications for democratic government.
1. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.090
(West 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.62 (West Supp. 1998). For courts upholding the constitu-
tionality of "three strikes and you're out" legislation, see, for example, State v. Thorne, 921 P.2d
514, 537 (Wash. 1996), and State v. Lindisey, 554 N.W.2d 215, 221 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
2. For a case upholding Megan's law, see, for example, Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263,
1284-85 (2d Cir. 1997).
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The general pattern of modern sentencing, particularly in the federal
courts, is to focus, rather impressionistically and unscientifically, on the
dangerousness of the offender. That is why the federal courts can consider
as aggravating factors a defendant's prior offenses-even those that have
been alleged but never proven beyond a reasonable doubt? That is why the
criteria for allocating cases to adult court or juvenile court depend heavily
on predictions of dangerousness, a judgment made prior to trial and convic-
tion.4 To speak of retributive punishment in a system of this sort is to mis-
represent crude policies of social protection as punishment that is just and
fair. Justifying these policies on cost/benefit grounds becomes feasible only
by suppressing a-whole range of personal and social costs that policy makers
prefer not to think about.
If the standard rationales for punishment fail to account for many of
our present practices, we should cut through our inhibitions and accurately
describe what we are doing. A good slogan to capture current policies of
criminal justice would be "waging war against the criminal class." Policy
makers have a good idea of who constitutes dangerous criminals, they target
detection procedures against them, and they apprehend them in ever
greater numbers. Apparently, as suggested by the composition of our pres-
ent prison population, the perceived criminal class consists largely of drug
users, and among them are an overwhelming number of blacks!
Of course, this war against the "criminal class" cannot be won: There
is a permanent supply of potential offenders and particularly of drug users.
But the war can have at least one important subsidiary purpose: It can cre-
ate a permanent undercaste of people who were once in prison, who are
stigmatized as felons, and who are subject to an array of collateral disabili-
ties traditionally associated with the status of being a felon. At common
law anyone could shoot a suspected felon in flight.6 The same right does
not apply against those suspected of committing misdemeanors, as though
some deep metaphysical distinction accounted for the difference between
felonies and misdemeanors. In addition to the informal impact on employ-
ment prospects and child custody disputes, the status of being a felon bears
3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6AI.3 commentary at 367 (1998). For
a case upholding the constitutionality of this practice, see, for example, United States v. Watts, 519
U.S. 148,156-57 (1997) (per curiam).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 90 F.3d 636 (2d Cir. 1996).
5. In 1996, 22% of all adult jail inmates in the United States were incarcerated for drug
law violations. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROFILE OF JAIL
INMATES 1996, at 4 (1998). Over 42% of those incarcerated for federal drug law violations, and
almost 60% of those in state prisons for drug offenses, are black. See KENDRA E. WRIGHT & PAUL
M. LEWIN, COMMON SENSE FOR DRUG POLICY FOUND., DRUG WAR FACTS 41 (1998).
6. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
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on qualification for jury service, and, significantly, on losing the right to vote
and to hold office. In a large (though decreasing) number of states, felons
are disenfranchised for life.8
According to voting qualification laws and constitutional provisions in
the vast majority of the fifty-one jurisdictions, felons serving time are not
allowed to vote The disqualification applies in varying degrees to con-
victed felons on probation, on parole, and after release from prison. Perma-
nent disenfranchisement applies in at least thirteen states. The Sentencing
Project reports the mosaic of American law in these terms:
In 46 states and the District of Columbia, felons are prohibited from
voting while in prison. In addition, 32 states prohibit offenders from
voting while on parole and 29 bar voting while on probation. Felons
are barred for life from voting in 14 states, a prohibition that can be
waived only through a gubernatorial pardon or some other form of
clemency. Only four states-Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire
and Vermont-allow prison inmates to vote.10
In Israel, an incarcerated felon led his Party (Shas) in its successful
campaign to gain seats in the last election for the Knesset, the Israeli par-
liament." Clearly, there is more than one way to think about the signifi-
cance of being labeled a felon.
Despite our efforts to overcome discrimination in the areas of race,
gender, illegitimacy, and alienage (as least by state governments), we still
yield to the need to stigmatize felons and to treat them as "untouchables."
They are the undercaste of American society. And among the untouchables,
the worst are clearly the sex offenders, who are treated as inherently suspect
for the rest of their lives."
I want to focus in this Article on political disenfranchisement as a
technique for reinforcing the branding of felons as the untouchable class of
American society. Those who have served their time are left with the message
that they are inherently unreliable members of the democracy. Whether
they would vote regularly or not, they are treated as though they were perma-
7. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-201 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 203 (West 1999); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1999).
8. 1 rely in this paper on the data supplied by the Sentencing Project and Human Rights
Watch to the Washington Post. See Michael A. Fletcher, Voting Rights for Felons Win Support,
WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1999, at Al.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Aryeh Dert resigned as head of the Shas Party on June 16, 1999, after announcing his
resignation from the parliament on May 18, 1999. See Deborah Sontag, 'Second Israel' Hails First
Big Election Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1999, at A3; Deborah Sontag, Israel: Shas Party Leader
Quits, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1999, at A6.
12. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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nently banished from the political community. Though the franchise has
spread in every conceivable manner to eliminate all discriminatory barriers,
including literacy tests and poll taxes, the new barrier based on felony
conviction has become ever more ominous. True, the trend in state legisla-
tures is to limit the use of permanent disenfranchisement, but the raw
numbers of people disenfranchised grows constantly.
The official rationale for this disqualification in American states seems
to be that felons, either in prison or after release, will corrupt the voting
process. The rhetoric is that disenfranchising felons is necessary to main-
tain the "purity of the ballot box."13 The argument has two forms, one mys-
tical, the other fanciful. The mystical claim is that tainted people will
corrupt the electoral process; felons are tainted and therefore will spread
their taint to the electoral process. A little more down-to-earth is the fan-
ciful claim that convicted felons pose a danger to the honesty of the proc-
ess: They are more likely than other people to engage in fraudulent schemes
to distort the balloting. Neither of these versions of the alleged need to
maintain the "purity of the ballot box" can withstand a minute of rational
argument. The argument of metaphysical taint has no place in a secular
legal culture, and it seems obvious that electoral officials can, with proper
measures, protect the honesty of the balloting process.
The only rationale for disenfranchisement that makes sense is that fel-
ons, by virtue of their crime and their conviction, forfeit their right to par-
ticipate in the political process. They are simply not entitled to the ordinary
rights of political participation enjoyed by other people. They suffer a change
of status that is sometimes called "civil death."14 This is the modem version
of the idea of infamia as applied in Roman law."
I suppose that at the time when all felons were in principle subject to
capital punishment, it probably did not do much harm to treat felons who
were not executed as civilly dead. After all, they were still alive, gratui-
tously, and therefore if they enjoyed fewer civil rights than others, they had
little ground to complain. This rationale obviously has little basis for appli-
cation in a time when the concept of felony implies simply that the offense
is subject to punishment by a year or more in prison.
Enter the racial factor. In the way Americans think about criminal
justice, race provides the lens for perceiving the way our institutions go awry.
13. Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1972) (quoting Washington v.
State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884)).
14. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REV.
803,869 (1993).
15. See 3 ANTONIO PERTILE, STORIA DEL DIRITTO ITALIANO DALLA CADUTA
DELL'IMPERO ROMANO ALLA CODIFICAZIONE 230-31,388 (2d ed. 1966).
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We might not quite see the injustice of capital punishment, but we readily
grasp the injustice of discriminatory application of the death penalty." We
might not sense the injustice of punishing the use of crack cocaine much
more severely than the use of powder cocaine, but when it turns out that
the burden of the more severe penalties falls on African Americans we sit
up and take notice."
And so it is with disenfranchisement as a sanction. The impact of dis-
enfranchisement is felt primarily in the black community. The statistics are
indeed disturbing. Fourteen percent of African-American men are ineligi-
ble to vote because of criminal convictions. 8 In seven states, one in four black
men are permanently barred from voting because of their criminal records. 9
The racial impact of the disenfranchisement means that we will finally
take cognizance of an unjust institution-one that betrays a primitive con-
ception of punishment and a deficient commitment to democratic voting.
In one promising decision the Supreme Court, without dissent, struck down
an Alabama constitutional provision that disenfranchised everyone who
committed a crime of moral turpitude."0 The Court found a current of racial
motivation in the convention that adopted the disenfranchising amend-
ment to the state constitution, and in fact the rule, as applied, had a dis-
proportionate impact on blacks.2
The problem with categorical disenfranchisement is that although the
policy clearly has an adverse racial impact today, it came into force without
the slightest racial animus. In fact, the reed on which the Supreme Court
has rested its general approval of felon disenfranchisement, namely Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, had as it purpose the facilitation of black
voting. The amendment provides:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states which
may be included within this Union according to their respective num-
16. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87, 312-13 (1987) (holding that
Georgia's death-sentencing process did not violate the Eighth Amendment even though a study
showed that the death penalty was imposed more often on black defendants and killers of white
victims than on white defendants or killers of black victims).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-71 (1996) (holding that for a
defendant to be entitled to discovery on a claim that he was singled out for prosecution because
of his or her race, the defendant must make a threshold showing that the government declined to
prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races).
18. Some 1.46 million African-American men are ineligible to vote out of an eligible
population of 10.4 million, slightly more than 14%. See Pierre Thomas, Study Suggests Black Male
Prison Rate Impinges on Political Process, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1997, at A3.
19. See generally THE SENTENCING PROJECT, POLICY REPORT NO. 9080, LOSING THE
VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (1998).
20. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
21. See id. at 228-30.
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bers, counting the whole number of persons in each State excluding
Indians not taxed. But whenever in any State the elective franchise
shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens, not less than
twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged, except for par-
ticipation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation
in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
not less than twenty-one years of age."
The obvious purpose of this section is to repudiate the stain in Article
I, Section 2, Clause 3, which based the apportionment of representation on
the number of free persons, "excluding Indians not taxed" and "three-fifths
of all other persons." 3 In addition to redefining the basis of representation
in Congress, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a sanction
that amounts to reducing the basis of representation in cases in which the
state had committed either of two wrongs. The first wrong is denying the
franchise to male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age. The sec-
ond wrong is abridging the franchise for the same group of citizens, except
for those who had participated in the Confederate rebellion or who com-
mitted some crime. If either of these wrongs is committed and we calculate
the ratio of the number of males disenfranchised in relation to the total
male electorate, the basis for representation in Congress will be reduced in
proportion to that ratio. In this context, the amendment recognizes the
possibility of abridging (as opposed to denying) the franchise for the com-
mission of crime.
Thus we have the following paradox of disenfranchisement: A con-
stitutional amendment was enacted to support the voting rights of emancipated
slaves. The text of this amendment refers to the possibility of disenfranchising
people who have committed crimes. Because patterns of law enforcement
have changed over the years, because the number of felons convicted has
greatly increased and because a large percent of those convicted are black,
the policy of felon disenfranchisement sharply reduces the voting rights
of African Americans. Thus, a constitutional provision designed in 1868 to
improve the political representation of blacks has turned out in the 1990s
to have precisely the opposite effect.
Reform is obviously in the offing. We cannot tolerate a mass denial of
voting rights to a significant segment of the population. The only question
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
23. Id. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
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is whether the reinstatement of voting rights for felons-both in prison and
out-will come by way of legislative change or constitutional ruling.
Congress would have the authority under the Fifteenth Amendment
to pass a statute that would suspend, by analogy to the legislation sus-
pending the use of literacy tests, all state laws disenfranchising felons. The
Fifteenth Amendment prohibits the states from denying the right to vote on
the basis of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 4 The argu-
ment would be that the use of the disenfranchisement had a discriminatory
impact on African Americans and therefore would have to give way to
legislation enforcing the mandate of the amendment. It might be possible,
even without congressional legislation enforcing the amendment, simply
to declare the disenfranchisement unconstitutional in those states where its
application had a discriminatory impact on black voting rights.
Admittedly, in Richardson v. Ramirez," the Supreme Court upheld a
provision in the California constitution that disqualified as electors in
California all those convicted of "infamous" crimes. The grounds of alleged
unconstitutionality were a violation of equal protection of the laws under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The reference to disenfranchisement for
"crime" in the second section of the same amendment was thought to be
sufficient to overcome even the minimal rationality requirements of equal
protection.27 Whatever the merits of that decision, the equal protection
argument would obviously be much stronger by adding the factor of racially
discriminatory impact.
Yet the very issue posed in Ramirez requires reconsideration. Even
apart from the racial impact, the use of disenfranchisement violates that con-
ception of democratic equality that we have developed since the Civil War.
The current racial impact necessitates a change in the law, but as in many
other situations, the racial factor simply brings into focus an institution that
is unjust and irrational as applied to anybody.
The basic issue is whether categorical divestment of voting rights
introduces an impermissible element of caste into the American political
system. My argument is that when properly understood as a continuation of
infamia, disenfranchisement for the commission of "infamous" crimes (an obvi-
ously suggestive term) or felonies should be regarded as unacceptable in the
American constitutional system.
24. Id. amend. XV, § 1.
25. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
26. See id. at 26-27.
27. See id. at 43, 55.
1902
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE
There are so many constitutional arguments against the disenfranchise-
ment of felons that one can only wonder at the survival of the practice.
Here is a catalogue of reasons, any one of which would be sufficient to prohibit
the practice:
A. Equal Protection of the Laws
In the California decision leading to the Supreme Court's upholding
felon disenfranchisement in Ramirez, the state supreme court struck down
the bar against allowing those convicted of "infamous crimes" to vote. 8
The court interpreted the "purity of the ballot box" rationale for the
disqualification as directed to the risk of electoral fraud. In view of tech-
nological changes in recording votes, this disqualification came to appear
unnecessary and therefore arbitrary and irrational relative to its supposed
purpose. This is a straightforward argument under the Equal Protection
Clause and would prevail, were it not for the arguably implicit exception in
Section 2 of the same amendment. The California Supreme Court did not
even notice this possibility of upholding felon disenfranchisement. None-
theless, justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of six, circumvented the
equal protection issue simply by citing the reference to the word "crime" in
Section 2.9
The majority's reliance on the text of the amendment hardly warrants
much confidence. Justice Marshall's dissent pinpointed the fallacy:
[B]ecause Congress chose to exempt one form of electoral discrimina-
tion from the reduction-of-representation remedy provided by § 2 does
not necessarily imply congressional approval of this disenfranchise-
ment. By providing a special remedy for disenfranchisement of a
particular class of voters in § 2, Congress did not approve all election
discriminations to which the § 2 remedy was inapplicable, and such
discriminations thus are not forever immunized from evolving
30
standards of equal protection scrutiny.
For example, the text of Section 2 refers to male voters over the age of
twenty-one. If all references in the text represented constitutionally legiti-
mate exceptions from voting rights, it would be acceptable-in the absence
28. See Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
29. See Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 41-46.
30. Id. at 75-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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of the Nineteenth Amendment-to deny women the right to vote. Yet
under current standards of equal protection analysis, attempting to justify
the denial of the franchise to women by invoking the text of Section 2
would be laughed out of court. Surprisingly, there is no similar laughter
attendant upon the parallel argument that the text of Section 2 warrants
denial to citizens "who have fully paid their debt to society" of their funda-
mental right to vote.'
B. Fifteenth Amendment
The Fifteenth Amendment, adopted two years after the Fourteenth,
explicitly prohibits the denial of voting rights on the basis of "previous con-
dition of servitude.""2 Therefore, even if there were an argument in Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to support felon disenfranchisement for
crime, this argument should be seen as superseded by the prohibition in the
later enacted amendment. "Servitude" seems to convey the same meaning
in this context as it does in the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits
"involuntary servitude" except as punishment for crime." joining the two
phrases generates a plausible reading that the Fifteenth Amendment, on its
face, prohibits depriving felons of their voting rights simply because they
were subject to "involuntary servitude" as punishment for their crime.'
C. Bill of Attainder
The strongest possible case in favor of felon disenfranchisement is that
the commission of a felony reveals a fundamental flaw of character that
properly disqualifies someone from voting. It is similar, as many disqualifi-
cation statutes suggest, to being insane or feebleminded. At first blush this
seems like an extraordinary generalization, but because it is the best argu-
ment one can make for felon disenfranchisement, let us take the argument
seriously.
31. Id. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
33. Id. amend. XIII, § 1.
34. See Walter Matthews Grant et al., Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a
Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1218-33 (1970); Howard ltzkowitz & Lauren
Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender's Right to Vote: Background and Developments, 11 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 721 (1973).
35. For statutes that disqualify potential jurors from jury service on the basis of soundness
of mind, see, for example, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 21-201(4) (West Supp. 1998); 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 305/2(3) (West Supp. 1999); and TEX. GovT CODE ANN. § 62.102(4) (West
1998).
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The problem is determining the inference that can be properly drawn
from the fact that an individual has committed a felony some time in his or
her life. Suppose the inference is that felons are not competent to drive and
that therefore they should not receive driver's licenses. The inference would
be patently unwarranted and therefore discriminatory against the category
of those once convicted of a felony. The conclusion comes easily that the
arbitrary classification would affront the Equal Protection Clause. More
interestingly, it would violate the prohibition of bills of attainder,36 as under-
stood in John Ely's interpretation of the clause 7 and the decision in labor
leader Archie Brown's successful attack on his being disqualified, by virtue
of being a member of the Communist Party, from serving as the officer of a
labor organization." The vice in bill of attainder legislation is that it violates
the separation of powers by a legislative determination that a particular
person is guilty. Concluding that all Communists would be likely to call
political strikes, the Court concluded, was an impermissible legislative
intrusion in the process of applying general norms to a particular people. 9
The general norm was: Those who call political strikes should not be labor
officials. Finding that all Communists were suspect as advocates of political
strikes, the legislature, in effect, determined that Brown and other members
of the party were guilty of political unreliability.
Finding that all felons are unlikely to be safe and competent drivers
would qualify as the same kind of impermissible legislative inference.
Denying someone a driver's license requires a particularized determination
of incompetence. A wholesale judgment by the legislature that some act,
such as conviction for a felony, constitutes a per se disqualification would
appear just as defective as a judgment that all Communists were inherently
suspect as labor union officials.
If the legislature may not make a wholesale judgment about who can
qualify as a labor official or who may receive a driver's license, why should it
be able to make a categorical judgment that felons are inherently unquali-
fied to exercise the democratic franchise? The Bill of Attainder Clause comes
into play, therefore, as an additional argument against the constitutionality
of the current practice of disenfranchising felons.
One might have some doubts about this argument as a result of the
impact of a conviction for a felony on qualifications for jury service. As an
36. Neither Congress nor the state legislatures may enact bills of attainder. See U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 9, ci. 3 (Congress); id. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 (states).
37. See Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to rte BiU of
Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330 (1962).
38. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
39. See id. at 454-56.
1905Disenfranchisement as Punishment
46 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1895 (1999)
example, the New York statute is typical in requiring that those who serve
on juries be residents of the county, citizens of the country, at least eighteen
years of age, competent in English, and, in addition, must "not have been
convicted of a felony." The disqualification of felons in this context seems
almost reasonable, largely because jury service is about deciding whether
other people shall be labeled felons or not. That one is a felon oneself
arguably generates an implicit bias, and because other sources of bias result
in automatic disqualification-e.g., being related to the victim or to the
accused-it does not seem excessive to disqualify convicted felons as pre-
sumptively biased.
By analogy, one might argue, voting rights should be treated the same
way. Since one of the primary tasks of elections is to determine policies
toward crime and punishment, someone who has fallen prey to the system is
likely to have too large a personal interest at stake to be neutral about the
issues. Yet bias does not disqualify people from voting. Indeed voting is
precisely about expressing biases, loyalties, commitments, and personal val-
ues. Excluding from the electorate those who have felt the sting of the
criminal law obviously skews the politics of criminal justice toward one side
of the debate.
The arguments against the' disenfranchisement of felons line up in a
convincing and powerful array. For legitimating the deprivation of voting
rights, one finds only the textual reference in Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The latter should give way to the claims of constitutional
reason. The reason of Section 2, it should be remembered, is historically
tied to the aftermath of the Civil War. Like Section 3 (disqualifying rebels
from holding office) and Section 4 (confederate debt cancelled) of the same
amendment, this provision on calculating the basis for congressional repre-
sentation was designed merely to address a problem posed by the war. It
was not meant to provide lasting constitutional guidance.
The very fact that there are so many compelling arguments against
felon disenfranchisement must make us wonder about the survival of the
practice. When the legislatures and the courts ignore the claims of reason,
there must be powerful interests and motives at stake.
II. THE DEEPER PROBLEM: CREATING A CASTE SYSTEM IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
It is difficult to deny that the criminal law treats convicted felons as
members of a special class. They are treated as inherently unreliable not
40. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1999).
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only for purposes of voting but also in giving sworn testimony at trial. Their
prior convictions are admissible in order to undermine their credibility, the
assumption being that felons are likely to be liars. The more serious burden
on the class of felons is that they are subject to more severe penalties for
committing the same .crimes that others commit. Their prior convictions
are admissible in order to enhance their penalties as "recidivists." The most
Draconian enhancement of this type is life imprisonment for the commis-
sion of the third felony.
How could one possibly justify this system.of using the criminal law to
create a subordinate class of persons subject to differential treatment for
their entire lives? Of course, one could always argue that these measures
deter crime. The only problem is that there is no proof that they do, and
even if they did, one might have qualms about creating a caste system as a
means of deterrence. For those of us inclined to think in the idiom of
retributive justice, the problem is more acute.
The way some people write about retributive justice, all that seems to
matter is the imposition of punishment either as an end itself or as a means
of expressing the outrage of the community. This strikes me as very odd.
Punishment as an imperative of justice hardly makes sense if the program of
punishment fails to include an opportunity for the offender's reintegration
into society. There is no point to the metaphor of paying one's debt to society
unless the serving of the punishment actually cancels out the fact of having
committed the crime. The idea that you would pay the debt and be treated
as a debtor (felon) forever verges on the macabre.
The challenge of recognizing that we implicitly endorse a caste system
in criminal law is to reformulate our theories of punishment. The emphasis
on reintegration into society should come front and center. Once we acknowl-
edge the necessity of reintegration, we could hardly maintain the practice of
disenfranchising felons. On the contrary, we should be encouraging inmates
to begin thinking of themselves as useful members of society with all the
attendant responsibilities. Having the responsibility to vote should be the
minimal condition for inculcating the sense that felons too are citizens.
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